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I. Abstract
Malaysia takes great pride in being a melting pot of different
cultures, races and religions, co-existing under the purportedly
moderate Islamic nation model. Despite the fragility that normally
exists in multiethnic societies, Malaysia has largely managed to
maintain harmonious co-existence between its citizens.
Nevertheless, the vibrant development of human rights awareness
and advocacy throughout the past decade introduced an additional
element into the dynamics of pluralism in the country. Human
rights have become standard talking points even amongst those in
the vanguard of cultural, political, and religious conservatism.
In Malaysia, race and religion are important, interconnected
issues, but they are also traditionally jealously guarded. There is
reluctance-at least in the public domain-to openly debate these
matters through the pretext of protecting multiethnic sensitivities.
However, several cases invoking the constitutional right to
religious freedom have been brought to the public eye and caused
considerable uproar in the Muslim-majority nation. They include,
but are not limited to, apostasy, religious conversions, and
acceptance of non-mainstream religious doctrines. These cases
raise pertinent questions about the boundaries of religious freedom
for Muslims and non-Muslims alike, especially when pitted
against considerations for religious rules, societal norms, and the
grander idea of collective social responsibility and national
stability.
This paper explores the conundrum between the fundamental
right to religious freedom enshrined in the international human
rights corpus and the exercise of that right in Malaysia. In doing
so, it examines controversial cases which tackle the essential
question of whether the Malaysian conception and practice of
religious freedom is consistent with international human rights
standards and entrenched constitutional rights. This paper will
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demonstrate that the parameters of freedom of religion in Malaysia
are shaped by various political and legal forces, as well as the
desire to maintain stability among the multiracial and multi-
religious population. By demonstrating the impact of prevailing
practices, it is hoped that this paper will prompt further discourses
to draw an acceptable idea of religious freedom that learns from
universal views of human rights, whilst maintaining aspects of
common traditional and cultural values.
II. Introduction
Malaysia takes great pride in its recognition as a "moderate
Islamic country."' As a result of inter-communal compromises in
1956, drafters of the post-colonial Federal Constitution
(hereinafter "Constitution") agreed to establish Islam as the
religion of the Federation.2 This acceptance of Islam was "part of
a political settlement in return of which [the non-Malays] would
obtain citizenship and the right to education in their mother
tongue."' The constitutional grounding of Islam however, does
not affect the right of non-Muslims to practice and profess their
own religions.4 Indeed, this is the central feature of religious
freedom in Malaysia, enumerated in Article 11 of the
Constitution.
Almost fifty years later, the rise of several high-profile cases
I See Shamani Darshni, Abdullah: Malaysia a Moderate Islamic Nation, THE NEW
STRAITS TIMES, May 9, 2005. Australian Prime Minister John Howard depicted
Malaysia as "a great example of a moderate, constructive and competitive Islamic
country." Muhammad Hussain, Malaysia: John Howard's 'Great Moderate Islamic
Nation, 'AMERICAN CHRONICLE (Dec. 14, 2006),
http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/17926.
2 Joseph M. Fernando, The Position ofIslam in the Constitution of Malaysia, 37 J.
SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUD. 249, 253 (2006) (citing the Alliance Memorandum to the Reid
Constitutional Commission on September 27, 1956, which states that "[t]he religion of
Malaysia shall be Islam. The observance of this principle shall not impose any disability
on non-Muslim nationals professing and practising their own religions.").
3 Andrew Harding, Sharia and National Law in Malaysia, in SHARIA
INCORPORATED: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF TWELVE MUSLIM
COUNTRIES IN PAST AND PRESENT 491, 499 (Jan Michiel Otto ed., 2010).
4 See Amin Amir Bin Abdullah, Islamic Revivalism, Religious Freedom and the
Non-Muslims in Malaysia: A Preliminary Discussion, 11 PERTANIKA J. Soc. ScI. & HUM.
119,119 (2003).
5 See CONST. OF MALAYSIA (1957), art. 11 (Malay.).
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invoking the right to religious liberty reveals serious problems
regarding the parameters of that right.6 In 2004, Lina Joy sought
to change her religious status on her national identity card at the
National Registry Department (NRD).' Born a Muslim, Joy
converted to Christianity and was baptized in 1998.8 The NRD
refused her application in the absence of an order from a Syariah
court affirming her conversion.' Joy did not seek recourse through
the religious courts, but applied to the civil courts on the grounds
that the denial to remove "Islam" from her identity card interfered
with her right to practice the religion of her choosing under the
Constitution."o The appeals proceeded to the Federal Court-the
highest court in the land-but Joy was unsuccessful."
Needless to say, the aftermath of the Lina Joy case drew
criticism from journalists, human rights lawyers, activists, and
organizations. Lina Joy was only one of the many cases
questioning the right to religious freedom in Malaysia. The
landmark ruling was expected to "[d]efine Malaysia's character as
a nation,"" and to settle once and for all, questions of whether
Malaysia "[w]ill go down the line of secular constitutionalism or
whether that Constitution will now be read subject to religious
requirements."l 3 Joy's lawyer, Malik Imtiaz Sarwar-himself a
Muslim-sees the Federal Court verdict as "a potential
dismantling of Malaysia's . .. multi-ethnic [and] multi-religious
[character]."l Clearly, this case has many ramifications in store
for the social, political and legal outlook of Malaysia. On the one
hand, Joy's case is seen as a grave violation of a fundamental right
6 See Julia E. Barry, Apostasy, Marriage and Jurisdiction in Lina Joy: Where Was
CEDA W? 41 INT'L L. & POL. 407, 409 (2009).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id at 410.
10 Id. at 409.
11 Id. at 410.
12 Cris Prystay, In Malaysia, A Test for Religious Freedom: Court Ruling on
Woman's Bid to Shed Muslim Label Will Help Define Nation's Character, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 25, 2006),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 115645160096844802.html?mod=googlenews wsj.
13 Id
14 Hannah Beech, Malaysia's Crisis of Faith, TIME (May 30, 2007),
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1626300,00.html.
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enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
("UDHR")." On the other, there is a fine distinction between
freedom of religion as understood in the UDHR, and the more
limited, carefully crafted religious liberty provision in the
Constitution.16 The latter is also supported by considerations of
Syariah law which prohibit apostasy.17 Thus, the extent to which
constitutional recognition of freedom of religion is consistent with
the purported universal idea of the same right is still a matter of
great debate. This tension also demonstrates a broader theme: the
tussle between universalist and relativist conceptions of human
rights.
The UDHR has evolved from an aspirational statement to a
body of norms accepted either as "part of customary international
law, or as an authoritative interpretation of the [UN] Charter's
human rights provisions."'" Its professed "universality" attracts
much criticism, especially from those resistant to the UDHR's
supposedly "Western ideas." With the rise of nationalism and
claims of "[c]ulture as national essence," " human rights are
challenged as a product of the individualistic, liberal West, and
inconsistent with communal, conservative or non-liberal values.20
For others, the idea of a common standard of fundamental rights
that one attains by the virtue of being human, rights which are
inalienable and indivisible regardless of race, creed, and
nationality, is a noble aspiration. Today, the human rights
movement has gone beyond mere idealism; it has transcended
national boundaries, infiltrated international institutions, and
embedded itself in the world's modern consciousness. 2 ' But this
15 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A,
U.N. Doc. AIRES 217(111) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
16 See CONST. OF MALAYSIA, supra note 5, art. 11.
17 See Barry, supra note 6, at 410.
18 Henry J. Steiner, et al., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW,
POLITICS, MORALS 161 (Henry J. Steiner, et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter Steiner et
al.].
19 Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence, in INTERNATIONAL
HuMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS, supra note 18, at 524, 527
(arguing that "[c]ulture as national essence" is fundamental to claims to indigenous
sovereignty and ethnonationalism, often in resistance to human rights).
20 See id
21 See Press Release, General Assembly, Ordinary People throughout the World
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rapid development has caused considerable tension in the claims
to human rights universality and the relativity of culture, raising
important questions that warrant our attention.
In multicultural and multi-religious Malaysia, disputes on
matters of religion and race are expected. The more important
questions, however, revolve around the manner in which politico-
legal forces resolve these disputes, and the impact on the dynamics
of pluralism in Malaysia. In an attempt to address these issues,
this article will proceed in four parts. Part III explains the
international human rights conception of the freedom of thought,
conscience and religion, and the two competing perspectives on
the issue, namely the universalist and relativist debate. Part IV
underlines related provisions of the Constitution and some
historical background as to how Malaysia's forefathers envisioned
those crucial constitutional provisions. Part V examines recent
cases with regard to the Malaysian experience in dealing with
freedom of religion issues. Finally, Part VI evaluates the issues
challenging and shaping the extent of freedom of religion in
Malaysia and attempts to reconcile the universalist-relativist
arguments on that freedom. This paper will demonstrate that the
parameters of freedom of religion in Malaysia are shaped by
various political and legal forces, as well as the desire to maintain
stability among the racially and religiously diverse population.
III. International Standards on Religious Freedom: Theories
and Perspectives
A. International Human Rights Instruments
Following the devastation of World War II, human rights rose
to prominence in the legal and political fora.22 The promulgation
of the UDHR purports to establish a foundational document that
transcends national boundaries and protects rights that are
Want Human Rights of Universal Declaration 'Translated into Reality,' UN High
Commissioner Tells Committee; Special Adviser Presents Report on Myanmar;
Committee Also Hears from Chair of Committee on Migrant Rights; Special Rappoteurs
on Rights to Health, Food, U.N. Press Release GAISHC/3956 (Oct. 21, 2009).
22 Nancy Flowers, A Short History of Human Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS HERE AND
Now: CELEBRATING THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/hreduseries/hereandnow/Part-1/short-
history.htm.
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fundamental by virtue of being human.2 3 Religion is precisely one
of those rights.2 4 Article 18 of the UDHR provides the right of
every individual to the freedom of thought, conscience and
religion.25 This is a truly broad provision-one that envisions not
just the right to practice and profess a religion, but also the right to
change one's religion. 26  The UDHR permits limitations to the
exercise of rights and freedoms "solely for the purpose of securing
due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others
and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and
the general welfare in a democratic society."27
Armed with the promise of respect for pluralism, equality and
non-discrimination, successive documents built on the UDHR's
provisions in greater detail. For instance, Article 18(2) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR")28
prohibits coercion that would impair a person's freedom to choose
his religion or belief. 29 This right, however, is not absolute.
Article 18(3) of the ICCPR allows limitations on manifestations of
religious beliefs that are "[p]rescribed by law and are necessary to
protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental
rights and freedoms of others."3 0 Thus, according to the Human
Rights Committee ("HRC"), Article 18 "[d]oes not permit any
limitations whatsoever on the freedom of thought and conscience
or on the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one's
choice."" The HRC also states that "[1]imitations may be applied
23 Id.
24 UDHR, supra note 15.
25 Id
26 Article 18 of the UDHR states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest
his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance." UDHR, supra note
15, art. 18.
27 Id. art. 29(2).
28 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. Doc. A/6136 (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
29 Id. at 178.
30 Jd
31 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 22: Article 18
(Freedom of Thought, Conscience or Religion), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (July 30, 1993)
[hereinafter HRC General Comment].
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only for those purposes for which they were prescribed and must
be directly related and proportionate to the specific need on which
they are predicated."3 2
The 1981 UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Beliefs
("1981 Declaration") also further refines the parameters of
religious freedom. " One striking provision is Article 2's
prohibition on discrimination on the basis of religion or other
beliefs.34 It also sets forth the right of parents or legal guardians of
a child "[t]o organize the life within the family in accordance with
their religion or belief.""
B. The Universal Argument
The key feature of the UDHR, or any of the subsequent human
rights instruments, is their universal aspirations, both in nature and
application.36 This is evident within the UDHR preamble, which
speaks of the "inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family"" and proclaims "a
common standard of achievement for all people and all nations."
Similarly, the 1981 Declaration proclaims the "universal respect
for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."39
The language of these human rights instruments does not
contemplate any differences that may exist between peoples or
nations. They address all regions and states, regardless of the
form of government, socio-economic situation or religious-cultural
traditions.40 However, in terms of application, what 'universal'
entails is a more complex question. Does this imply that all rights
32 Id
33 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/36/55 (Nov. 25 1981) [hereinafter 1981 Declaration].
34 Id
35 Id
36 See UDHR, supra note 15.
37 Id
38 Id
39 1981 Declaration, supra note 33.
40 Steiner et al., supra note 18, at 517.
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are to be conceived and implemented in the same manner
everywhere? There are different schools of thought on what
'universalism' involves,4 ' but the underlying belief of the universal
movement is that the basic values and concepts underlying human
rights are common to all people. While this is plausible on its
face, a deeper reflection of this idea may expose inherent dangers.
In this respect, Donnelly flags the problem of moral imperialism,
especially given radical universalists' prioritizing of the "demands
of the cosmopolitan moral community over all other ('lower')
moral communities."42
On the freedom of religion, advocates of universality claim
that it is and must be the same everywhere, just like rights to equal
protection, physical security, fair trials, free speech, and free
association. 43 Universal laws of human rights apply to all
regardless of their religion, and nation-states cannot deny the
duties of humanity on the mere basis of religious differences." As
Higgins argues, "[h]uman rights are human rights and not
dependent on the fact that states, or groupings of states, may
behave differently from each other so far as their politics,
economic policy, and culture are concerned."4 5 The human rights
movement insists on non-theistic ideas as the basis for the modern
human rights regime, reflecting a "[q]uest for universal acceptance
and universal commitment to a common moral intuition articulated
41 See Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Human Rights, 6 HuM. RTs. Q. 400,
400 (1984), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/762182 (stating that "radical
universalism" would hold that moral rights and rules are universally valid and culture is
irrelevant). Donnelly appears to reject the idea of radical universalism as it denotes a
"complete denial of national and subnational ethical autonomy and self-
determination..." Id. at 402.
42 Id.
43 Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 139, supra note 18, at 142 (arguing that universalists
accept that this claim applies only to the general content of such rights, and they do in
fact recognize that many basic rights allow for historically and culturally influenced
forms of implementation and realization).
44 Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Idea of European International Law, 17 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 315, 316 (2006).
45 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It,
in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS, supra note 18,
at 539.
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in specific agreed-upon terms." 6 For this reason, human rights are
often dismissed as promoting highly individualistic and secular
ideas which differ from prevailing (and varying) cultural norms
and practices.4 7
C. The Cultural Relativist Argument
The relativist argument is based on the idea of autonomy and
self-determination, 48 both of which are not unknown concepts to
international law. Amongst the relativists, the Western
Enlightenment foundations of human rights ideals4 9 render these
ideals' validity to other cultures and regions questionable." They
argue that the UDHR says very little about collective rights and is
more directed towards a post-war human rights regime focused on
individual rights. " Relativists also consider it hard, if not
impossible, to translate human rights into cultures which
emphasize the role of the family and community living,
particularly in cultures where religion (or religions) play an
important role.5 2 Donnelly identifies different types of cultural
relativism, " but their basic claims about human rights are
46 Louis Henkin, Religion, Religions and Human Rights, 26 J. OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS
229, 234 (1998), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/40008655.
47 Id. at 233.
48 Donnelly, supra note 41, at 400.
49 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim, Islam and Human Rights: Beyond the Universality
Debate, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 94TH
ANNUAL MEETING 95, 96 (Apr. 4-8, 2000), available at
http://www.1aw.emory.edu/aannaim/pdfiles/dwnldl3.pdf.
50 Peter G. Danchin, Who is the 'Human' in Human Rights? The Claims of Culture
and Religion, 24 MD. J. INT'L L. 94, 95 (2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1399444 (recognizing that part of the problem with the
international human rights movement is its particular time and place of origin, i.e., "post-
Enlightenment, rationalist, secular, Western, modern, and capitalist").
51 Id at 105.
52 See id at 118.
53 "Strong cultural relativism holds that culture is the principal source of the
validity of a moral right or rule .. .. [T]he presumption is that rights (and other social
practices, values, and moral rules) are culturally determined, but the universality of
human nature and rights serves as a check on the potential excesses of relativism ....
Weak cultural relativism holds that culture may be an important source of the validity of
a moral right or rule." The latter would "recognize a comprehensive set of prima facie
universal human rights and allow only relatively rare and strictly limited local variations
and exceptions."). Donnelly, supra note 41, at 400-01.
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grounded on respect for ethical and cultural diversity.54 Rights and
rules about morality depend on cultural contexts; "culture" is used
broadly to include not only indigenous traditions and customs, but
also political and religious ideologies." Hence, on the basis that
there are no trans-cultural ideas of rights that can be agreed upon, 6
we have witnessed the emergence of "Asian Values" and Islamic
human rights.
Relativists find great difficulty in reconciling universal rights
with the differing ideas of religious freedom." They also invoke
the bigger idea of social responsibility and national stability to
defend practices that arguably contradict such freedom." It is
argued that ideas and morality of religions differ from those of
human rights, not only in their sources of authority, but also in
their forms of expression and elements.5 9 The secular human
rights doctrine is deemed contradictory to the fundamental tenets
of monotheistic religions because the former is based on
individual autonomy and responsibility and systemic-rational
principles, while the latter "is based on the subjection of the
individual and the community to the will of God."o Different
religions also claim their respective moral codes as the basis of
ethical, moral and social order, taking precedence over man-made
laws and rights. 61 The human rights corpus, underived from any
54 See id. at 402.
55 Steiner et al., supra note 18, at 518; see also Azizuddin Sani, Mahathir
Mohamad as a Cultural Relativist: Mahathirism on Human Rights, paper presented at
the 17' Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia in Melbourne,
at 2 (July I - 3, 2008) (stating the argument advanced by Malaysia's former Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohamad, who explained that the Malaysian perspective of Asian
Values is based on Malay-Islamic culture and that the Western conception of rights can
corrupt Malaysian culture and religious beliefs).
56 Steiner et al., supra note 18, at 518.
57 See Henkin, supra note 46, at 237.
58 See Baldwin Robertson, Refocusing the Human Rights Debate in East Asia: A
Review of Recent Writings, CARNEGIE COuNcIL: THE VOICE FOR ETHICS IN
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Sept. 4, 1995),
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/publications/dialogue/l 02/articles/51 0.html.
59 Henkin, supra note 46, at 230.
60 Frances Raday, Culture, Religion and Gender, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 663, 668
(2003).
61 "Religions have not had confidence in an ideology that does not claim divine
origin or inspiration and has no essential place for the Deity." Henkin, supra note 46, at
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holy texts or supreme higher order, is questioned by adherents
who see themselves bound by the moral codes of their respective
faiths.62
Therefore, the UDHR is confronted with the question of "how
the right mediates between its purportedly secular and objective
position, and the subjectivity of particular religious norms." The
tension is evidenced in the concepts of religious duty and religious
freedom, especially because in some religions there is a clear
rejection of at least some religious choice, condemnation of
apostasy, and resistance towards the proselytizing of their
constituents by other religions.6
IV. The Malaysian Constitutional Framework on Religion
and Religious Freedom
To conceptualize freedom of religion in Malaysia, it is
important to understand several provisions of the Constitution.
First, although the Malaysian legal system modeled after the
Westminster system, it is often taken for granted that there is a
written Constitution in place. 65  The Constitution, according to
Article 4, is the supreme law of the land.66 It is at the apex of the
legal hierarchy, so any Acts of parliament to the contrary may be
deemed unconstitutional. 67 Federal Judge Raja Azian Shah's
account on constitutional supremacy is particularly telling:
[T]he Constitution ... is the supreme law of the land
embodying 3 basic concepts: One of them is that the
individual has certain fundamental rights upon which not
even the power of the State may encroach. The second is
233. "The Universal Declaration is neither antireligious nor nonreligious. It is - many
believe - a magnificent articulation of our common morality, and an essential support for
religion, for religions, for humankind, in the troubled hopeful world at the new
millennium." See id at 234.
62 See id. at 233.
63 Danchin, supra note 50, at 96.
64 Henkin, supra note 46, at 231.
65 See ANDREW J. HARDING, LAW, GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION IN
MALAYSIA 47 (1996).
66 CONST. OF MALAYSIA, supra note 5, art. 4, sec. 1. "This Constitution is the
supreme law of the Federation and any law passed after Merdeka Day which is
inconsistent with this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void." Id.
67 See id.
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the distribution of sovereign power between the States and
the Federation, that the 13 States shall exercise sovereign
power in local matters and the nation in matters affecting
the country at large. The third is that no single man or
body shall exercise complete sovereign power, but that it
shall be distributed among the Executive, Legislative and
Judicial branches of the government.
A. Islam as Religion of the Federation
Unlike the United States Constitution, the Malaysian
Constitution does not prohibit the establishment of religion.
Article 3(1) states that Islam shall be the religion of the
Federation, but other religions may be practiced in peace and
harmony within the Federation.69 This provision is a product of
inter-communal compromises reached in a pre-independence
memorandum (hereinafter "Alliance memorandum") constructed
by the three main political parties in 1956 to safeguard the rights
and interests of all communities.70
Scholars have advanced various interpretations of Article 3,
primarily connected to its ceremonial, historical and traditional
significance. " For instance, Sheridan and Groves argue that
Article 3 entails the use of Muslim rites in religious parts of
federal ceremonies.72 Thomas suggests that the incorporation of
Article 3 gives due regard to the elements and traditions of the
Malay states long before the colonial period, i.e., the Sultanate,
Islamic religion, Malay language, and Malay privilege." The
constitutional ideas of the Malay states stem from the Melaka
Sultanate in the fifteenth century, where Buddhist, Hindu and
Islamic influences permeated through the systems of law and
68 Loh Kooi Choon v. Gov't ofMalaysia, 2 M.L.J. 187, 188 (1977).
69 CONST. OF MALAYSIA, supra note 5, art. 3, sec. 1.
70 Tommy Thomas, Is Malaysia an Islamic State?, 4 MALAY. L. J. ARTS. 15, 17
(2006).
71 Id.; Fernando, supra note 2, at 249.
72 See L. A. SHERIDAN & HARRY E. GROVES, THE CONSTITUTION OF MALAYSIA 31
(4' ed. 1987) (stating "[t]he intention in making Islam the official religion of the
Federation was primarily for ceremonial purposes."). See also Thomas, supra note 70, at
29.
73 Thomas, supra note 70, at 3 1.
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governance.7 4  Shad Faruqi stressed that "[t]he implication of
adopting Islam as the religion of the Federation is that Islamic
education and way of life can be promoted for Muslims. Islamic
institutions can be established. Islamic courts can be set up.
Muslims can be subjected to Syariah laws in certain areas
provided by the Constitution."7 5
Historical evidence suggests that although the Alliance
memorandum discussed Islam as a religion for Malaysia, it
emphasized that this should not affect non-Muslims' right to
profess and practice their religion, and there is no implication that
the State is not a secular State.7 6 Chief Justice Abdul Hamid, the
Reid Commission member from Pakistan, opined that the
provision on Islam as the religion of the State is innocuous.
However, "secular" as intended by the founding fathers, does not
connote an anti-religious or anti-Islamic state of governance."
The Constitution envisages Syariah laws which would govern the
personal law requirements of Muslims, though it recognizes that
the Syariah would not be made the supreme law.79
All these views were espoused by the Malaysian Supreme
Court in the landmark case of Che Omar bin Che Soh v. Public
Prosecutor." The Court reiterated the secular character of the law
74 HARDING, supra note 65, at 5-6 (1996).
75 Shad Saleem Faruqi, Freedom ofReligion under the Constitution, THE SUN (May
18, 2006), http://www.sun2surf.com/article.cfm?id=l 4147.
76 The White Paper issued by the British Government on June 14, 1957, which
contained the constitutional provisions for an independent Malaya, reiterated that a
declaration of Islam as "the religion of the Federation . . . will in no way affect the
present position of the Federation as a secular State." Thomas, supra note 70, at 18-19.
"Although Article 3 names Islam as the religion of the Federation, it has until recently
always been agreed that this provision does not in any sense establish an Islamic state,
but merely provides for the religious nature of state ceremony." Harding, supra note 3,
at 506.
77 Thomas, supra note 70, at 19.
78 Malik Imtiaz Sarwar, Latifah Mat Zin: Reaffirming the Supremacy of the
Constitution, DISQUIET (July 29, 2007, 12:56 PM),
http://malikimtiaz.blogspot.com/2007/07/latifah-mat-zin-reaffirming-supremacy.html.
79 Id ("Unlike the Constitution of Pakistan that entrenches the Syariah as the basis
of all law, the Federal Constitution does not accord the Syariah law such status.").
80 Che Omar bin Che Soh v. Public Prosecutor, 2 M. L.J. 55 (1988). In this case,
the accused was faced with a mandatory death sentence for drug trafficking. He
challenged the sentence on the basis that the imposition of the death penalty for the
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and governance system, which resulted from colonial
Anglo/Malay treaties. " It also emphasized that the British
establishment of secular institutions separated Islam into public
and private aspects; Islamic law "[w]as rendered isolated in a
narrow confinement of the law of marriage, divorce, and
inheritance only."8 2 It is only in this sense of dichotomy that the
framers of the Constitution understood the meaning of the word
Islam in Article 3.
Despite the foregoing arguments, it is notable that the
establishment of a particular religion over the State is not unique
to Malaysia. In Norway, primacy of Christianity means that the
king and a majority of the cabinet are required to be members of
the state church. Additionally, in England, the Anglican Church
remains at the center of public policy and has substantial support
from the state.84
B. Freedom of Religion
Article 11 guarantees the freedom of religion," which on its
offence is contrary to Islamic injunction and therefore, unconstitutional and void. Id at
55.
81 See id. at 56.
82 See id
83 Dinah Shelton & Alexander Kiss, A Draft Model Law on Freedom of Religion
(1996) in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS
supra note 18, at 575.
84 Id. at 576.
85 CONST. OF MALAYSIA, supra note 5, art. 11. Article 11 reads:
(1) Every person has the right to profess and practice his religion and, subject to
Clause (4), to propagate it.
(2) No person shall be compelled to pay any tax the proceeds of which are
specially allocated in whole or in part for the purposes of religion other than his
own.
(3) Every religious group has the right -
(a) to manage its own religious affairs;
(b) to establish and maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes;
and
(c) to acquire and own property and hold and administer it in accordance with
law.
(4) State law and in respect of the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur, Labuan
and Putrajaya, federal law may control or restrict the propagation of any
religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion of Islam.
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face seems comprehensive enough to safeguard this fundamental
right for the pluralistic Malaysian society. A citizen reserves the
right to profess, practice and-subject to Article 11(4)-to
propagate his religion. 86 Religious groups have the right to
manage their own religious affairs or any matters relating to the
properties and the establishment of religious institutions.87 Article
11, on its face, prohibits the conversion of a Muslim." At the
same time, unlike the international human rights instruments on
religious freedom, it does not explicitly include the right to change
one's religion." However, it is suggested that Article 11 can be
construed broadly to include one's freedom to relinquish or
change a religious belief (albeit with limitations for Muslims
under specific religious laws), and even not to be religious.90
Article 11 is also bolstered by other constitutional provisions."
First, to combat subversion, Article 149 permits the enactment of
laws which would otherwise be inconsistent with selected
fundamental rights such as freedom of speech or personal liberty.9 2
However, it does not permit any encroachments on religious
freedom. Second, even if a state of emergency is declared, any
emergency laws enacted thereafter cannot curtail freedom of
religion.94 Third, Article 8 prohibits discrimination on the grounds
of religion against public sector employees; in the acquisition or
holding of property; and in any trade, business or profession.95 It
is also notable that freedom of religion is in no way affected by
Article 3's establishment of Islam as the religion of the
(5) This article does not authorize any act contrary to any general law relating to
public order, public health or morality.
Id
86 See id art. 11(4).
87 See id. art. 11(3).
88 See generally id art. 11 (discussing the freedom of religion).
89 See id
90 Thomas, supra note 70, at 34.
9I See id.
92 See id.
93 Id.
94 CONST. OF MALAYSIA, supra note 5, art. 150(6A).
95 Id. art. 8.
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Federation.96 Article 3(4) states that nothing in Article 3 derogates
from any other provision in the Constitution.97
Be that as it may, the freedom of religion is subject to several
restraints. Article 11(5) limits this freedom on grounds of public
order, public health or morality.98 Thus, any religious act deemed
contrary to general laws relating to these grounds is unsustainable
under Article 11.9 In the case of Muslim citizens, there may be
additional restraints to religious freedom by virtue of Schedule 9,
List II, Item I of the Constitution. This grants power to State
Assemblies to enact laws to punish Muslims for offences against
the precepts of Islam, such as khalwat, adultery, apostasy,
gambling, drinking and deviationist activities.100
A more controversial provision is Subsection 4's limitation on
the propagation of religion among Muslims. It would appear that
this subsection contradicts the idea of religious freedom,
especially for those religions that regard proselytizing as a crucial
part of worship."' Contrary to this view are some important
arguments. First, laws controlling propagation are meant "to
prevent Muslims from being exposed to heretical religious
doctrines, be they of Islamic or non-Islamic origin, and
irrespective of whether the propagators are Muslims or non-
Muslims."' 0 2 Shad Faruqi adds that such restrictions are meant to
protect Muslims against organized international missionary
activities and to preserve social harmony, rather than prioritizing
any particular religion.o3 Second, Subsection 4 does not in and of
itself restrict propagation. Sheridan and Groves argue that it
merely renders it constitutional for state law (or federal law in the
case of the Federal Territories) to control or restrict propagation.'0 4
96 Id. art. 3(1).
97 Id. art. 3(4).
98 Id. art. 11(5).
99 See id.
100 See CONST. OF MALAYSIA, supra note 5, art. 11(5); see also Masum, Freedom of
Religion under the Malaysian Federal Constitution, 2 CLJ i, iii (2009).
101 Sheridan & Groves, supra note 72, at 31.
102 Masum, supra note 100, at iii-iv.
103 See Shad Saleem Faruqi, Support for Religious Liberty, SUNDAY STAR (Feb. 25,
2001).
104 See Sheridan & Groves, supra note 72, at 76.
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Case law has to a certain extent, been instrumental in
developing restraints on religious freedom. This is particularly
true of the word 'practice' in Article 11, culminating in the non-
mandatory practices doctrine. In essence, this means that freedom
of religion extends only to those practices and rituals that are
essential and mandatory. 1o In Hjh Halimatussaadiah bte Hj
Kamaruddin v. Public Services Commission, Malaysia &
Another,0 6 the court rejected a woman's appeal to wear a purdah
(a headdress covering a woman's entire face except the eyes) to
work because the government was entitled to forbid non-essential
and optional religious traditions in the interests of the public
service. Similarly, in Meor Atiqulrahman bin Ishak & Others v.
Fatimah Sihi & Others,107 the court rejected demands by Muslim
boys to be allowed to wear turbans to school.
V. The Malaysian Experience: Religious Freedom in Practice
Despite the constitutional grounding of religious freedom in
Malaysia, this issue remains very complicated in practice. The
frontiers of freedom of religion are not always clear, and this is
further obscured by political, social and racial elements. The
problem arises not only between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens,
but also within the Muslim community. This implicates a contest
between those intent upon a modern liberal interpretation of
universal human rights principles, and those insistent on
communally-based, constitutional-contract politics in Malaysia.'
A. Religious Conversions and Inter-faith Conflicts
Constitutionally, religious conversions not only involve
questions of religious freedom, but also the role of Islam as
religion of the Federation, specific Islamic rules on apostasy, the
role of Syariah courts, as well as one's ethnic status. The most
pertinent issue is whether the exercise of this freedom includes the
105 Masum, supra note 100, at 4.
106 Hjh Halimatussaadiah bte Hj Kamaruddin v. Public Services Commission,
Malaysia & Another, 3 M. L.J. 61, 61 (1994).
107 Meor Atiqulrahman bin Ishak & Others v. Fatimah Sihi & Others, 4 M.L.J. 605,
616 (2006).
108 Marzuki Mohamad, Religion, Human Rights and Constitutional-Contract
Politics in Malaysia, 16 INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE 155, 155 (2008).
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freedom of Muslims to renounce the Islamic faith. The Malaysian
courts have dealt with conversions and apostasy many times over
the years, and the results are quite varied. For one, there is the
notable case of Soon Singh.'o Soon Singh was brought up as a
Sikh but converted to Islam, later renounced Islam, and sought a
declaration in the Kuala Lumpur High Court that he was no longer
a Muslim."o The court dismissed his application on the grounds
that the subject matter in the application fell within the jurisdiction
of the Syariah Courts."' In Kamariah bte Ali,"2 a cult member
was sentenced to two years in jail for apostasy."' There is also the
case of Siti Fatimah Tan Abdullah v. Majlis Agama Islam Pulau
Pinang, 14 which saw the courts exercising some degree of
leniency in allowing the appellant, who converted to Islam to
marry an Iranian, to later renounce the religion.
However, it was Lina Joy that has gained international
attention and widespread local debate. "' Joy argued that the
National Registration Department's (NRD's) requirement of a
Syariah court's confirmation of her conversion violated her
constitutional right to freedom of religion."6 The Federal Court,
however, upheld the NRD's requirement before Joy could
officially change her religious status on her identity card."' The
majority opinion also held that one can renounce Islam but still
must follow Islam's procedure to do so, and agreed with
submissions of various Muslim Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs) that wilful and whimsical conversions could cause chaos
109 Andrew Christopher Simon, Soon Singh Bikar Singh v. Pertubuhan Kebajikan
Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) & Another, I M.L.J. 489,489 (1999).
110 See id.
I Id. at 502.
112 See Andrew Christopher Simon, Kamariah bte Ali v. Kelantan Government, 3
M.L.J. 657, 657 (2002).
113 See id.
114 See Siti Fatimah Tan Abdullah v. Majlis Agama Islam Pulau Pinang, (2006)
Cas. 07100-043-0191-2006 (Syariah High Court of Pulau Pinang).
115 Carolyn Evans, Constitutional Narratives: Constitutional Adjudication on
Religious Clauses in Australia and Malaysia, 23 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 437, 460 (2009).
116 Loo Lai Mee, Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Another,
4 M.L.J. 585, 593 (2007).
117 See id. at 464.
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to Islam and its adherents."' Although this case was largely an
administrative law matter, it was also rife with important
constitutional questions.
First, if we view the rights provisions as a mechanism of
preventing State interference with a citizen's fundamental
liberties, Joy's argument is plausible. Indeed, civil and political
rights, such as religious freedom, are of a negative nature; that is,
the State simply must not encroach upon a citizen's exercise of
those rights. Second, the fact that the majority required adherence
to particular procedures for renouncing Islam (namely, a Syariah
court confirmation), and that considering the effect on Muslims is
contestable, this suggests that Article 11 is being read in light of
Article 3. 119 The constitutional basis of this approach is
problematic because Article 3(4) clearly states that the
establishment of Islam as the religion of the Federation does not
affect other provisions of the Constitution. 120 The majority
holding also treads on the constitutional guarantee of equality
regardless of race or religion. 21 From an Islamic perspective, it is
worth mentioning that apostasy, once committed (for instance, by
pronouncing oneself to have or intend to renounce Islam), is
considered valid regardless of its endorsement by any particular
authority. 122
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the decision is the
apparent side-stepping of constitutional issues and deference to the
Syariah court in matters implicating one's freedom of religion. It
reveals a crucial lacuna in the legal system due to the overlapping
of civil and Syariah jurisdictions. 123 On the one hand,
constitutional rights and interpretation fall squarely within the
purview of the civil courts. Harding argues that matters within the
Islamic jurisdiction are personal rather than constitutional, and that
118 See Evans, supra note 115, at 463-64.
119 See id. at 464. See also Harding, supra note 3, at 511 (arguing that the ruling
that Joy could only convert with an order of the Syariah court "[e]levated article 3 to a
higher status than article 11").
120 See discussion supra Part II.B.
121 See Loo Lai Mee, supra note 116, at 626.
122 See Mohd Asri Zainul Abidin, Apostasy: Between Emotions and Reality, MINDA
TAIDID (July 22, 2007), available at http://drmaza.com/english-section/?p=17.
123 See discussion infra Part VI.A. (analyzing the conflict between civil and Syariah
jurisdictions).
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the "[c]onstitutional law requires that jurisdiction of the ordinary
courts to rule finally on matters of legality should be preserved."1 24
On the other hand, conversions out of Islam are deemed a matter
for the Syariah courts due to the separation of the civil-Syariah
jurisdiction in 1988. The problem here is that state-enacted
Islamic laws regulating conversions are not always consistent with
the notion of religious freedom. Moreover, barring a few states,
there is no clear legislative enactment on how to deal with
apostates or those who seek to convert. 125 It is also unlikely that
individuals would voluntarily go to the Syariah courts to convert
because those efforts may either be futile, 126 or they will be
subjected to punishment and/or counselling sessions.127  In Lina
Joy, the government did not produce any evidence that the courts
ever granted the requested certificates, considering apostasy is a
serious sin in Islamic law and one that the community of believers
is obliged to prevent.128
The outcome of Lina Joy restricts freedom of religion and, to a
certain extent, puts it in a state of flux. There is no clear answer to
whether the Federal Court would be willing to fight tooth and nail
to uphold Article 11 and permit conversions among Muslims. The
trend of side-stepping issues of constitutional importance and
obscuring the boundaries of religious freedom in Malaysia
124 HARDING, supra note 65, at 138.
125 Zulkifli Hasan, Islamic Criminal Offenses in Malaysia and the Extent of its
Application, June 9, 2008, http://zulkiflihasan.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/isu-undg-
jnyh-msia.pdf.
126 See generally Simon, supra note 112, at 660 (discussing how sustained
applications to the Syariah courts were rejected). The Court of Appeal however, held
that the legislation in question-the state of Kelantan's section 102 of Enactment
4/1994-does not prevent a Muslim from renouncing Islam. Id. But this cannot be done
unilaterally and a declaration must be sought from the Syariah court. Id. See also Daud
bin Mamat & Others v. Majlis Agama Islam & Another, 2 M. L.J. 390, 402 (2001)
(suggesting that the right to exit a religion is not within the scope of Article 11 and the
fact that the plaintiffs are Muslims ousted the court's subject matter jurisdiction).
127 See the state of Negeri Sembilan's Sections 119(1) and 119(8) Administration of
Islam Enactment (Negeri Sembilan)(2003),
http://www.ecoi.net/file upload/1997_1293698291_mys33057.pdf (requiring an
individual who seeks to convert to first apply to a Syariah court for a declaration that he
or she is no longer a Muslim; the convert will then be counselled for a year, and if his or
her position does not change, the court may grant the application).
128 See Evans, supra note 115, at 461.
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continued in a recent child conversion case.129 In that case, a
Hindu woman appealed against a High Court decision affirming
the validity of her children's conversion to Islam without her
consent.'3 0 Shamala and her husband were both Hindus at the time
of their marriage, but her husband later converted to Islam along
with their minor children.13 ' The High Court ruled that Shamala's
application to invalidate the conversion was not within its
jurisdiction because the children were now Muslims and as such,
they were subject to the Syariah jurisdiction.'32 The High Court
accepted that Shamala, being a non-Muslim, was without recourse,
as she was not within Syariah jurisdiction.' The Court only
suggested that Shamala seek assistance from the Islamic Council
of the Federal Territories.13 The case was referred to the Federal
Court.
One of the crucial questions on appeal was whether the
Syariah court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity
of minors' conversions to Islam once they have been registered as
Muslims. 3 s The Court was also called upon to determine the
appropriate forum for a non-Muslim parent to assert his or her
rights and remedies in cases of unilateral conversion of children.'36
In November 2010, the Federal Court rejected Shamala's referral
application on the basis that Shamala was in contempt of a High
Court order requiring her to bring her children to Malaysia."3
Shamala had apparently left the country with her children in
2004. '" Commentators criticized the Federal Court's apparent
129 See Shamala Sathiyaseelan v. Dr. Jeyaganesh C. Mogarajah & Another, 2
M.L.J. 648 (2004) (ruling that the consent of a single parent is enough to validate the
conversion of a child).
130 See id. at 655-56.
131 See id.
132 Id. at 657-58.
133 See id.
134 See id. at 658.
135 Art Harun, Shamala and the Skirt of Technicalities, MALAYSIAN INSIDER (NOV.
24, 2010), http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/breakingviews/article/shamala-and-the-
skirt-of-technicalities-art-harun/.
136 See id.
137 See id
138 See Federal Court Rejects Shamala's Referral Application (Updated), STAR,
Nov. 12, 2010, http://www.thesundaily.com/article.cfmn?id=53983.
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hands-off approach as a mere skirting on technicalities. 139It
appears that the Court had failed to appreciate the gravity of the
constitutional issues presented before it,140 and that it missed the
opportunity to clarify those issues, especially as there are other
similar cases awaiting resolution.14 '
B. Religious Doctrines
The extent of religious freedom in Malaysia is also challenged
by restrictions on religious doctrines. As the preceding section
demonstrates, 142 States reserve the right to restrict or control
propagation of any religious doctrines among Muslims. These
limitations affect both Muslims and non-Muslims communities
alike. The first implication is that non-Muslims' freedom to
practice their religion may be severely curtailed with respect to
propagation of their religion to Muslims.14 3 There are some State
and Federal laws restricting the right to propagate any non-Muslim
religious doctrine or belief among Muslims, such as Terengganu's
The Control and Restriction of the Propagation of Non-Islamic
Religious Enactment 1980.'" For the Federal Territories, Article
5 of the Syariah Criminal Offence Act 1997 states:
[A]ny person who propagates religious doctrine or belief
other than the religious doctrine or beliefs of the religion of
Islam among persons professing the Islamic faith shall be
guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be liable to
fine not exceeding three thousand ringgit or to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to
both.145
As a matter of constitutional law, these legislations are
perfectly constitutional by virtue of Article 11(4). 146
139 See Harun, supra note 135.
140 See id
141 Roger Tan, Time to Break the Impasse, STAR, Nov. 21, 2010,
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?sec=focus&file=/2010/11/21/focus/7471860.
142 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
143 See id.
144 See "Qualified Religious Freedom," NECF MALAYSIA (Mar.-Apr. 2004)
http://www.necf.org.my/newsmaster.cfi?&menuid=2&actionview&retrieveid-412.
145 Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997, available at
www.agc.gov.my/Akta/Vol.%2012/Act%20559.pdf.
146 Andrew Harding, The Keris, The Crescent and the Blind Goddess: The State,
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Restrictions on propagation may well be connected to concerns
of widespread proselytism and conversions among Muslims. 14
While such restrictions interfere with the right to practice a
religion, it is often taken for granted that proselytism itself may be
deemed a serious encroachment of religious freedom. If this right
is to be meaningful, individuals should also be free from any
compulsion or undue influence to adopt a particular belief. Thus,
conversion resulting from compulsion or undue influence is more
problematic than conversion out of one's free will. In a
multiethnic society like Malaysia, the former is potentially
divisive and may threaten social order. An instructive case on this
is Minister of Home Affairs & Another v Jamaluddin bin
Othman, 148 where an individual was detained under Internal
Security Act 1960 ("ISA") for allegedly disseminating Christianity
among Malays and converted six Malays to Christianity. It was
suggested that this could ignite tensions between the Christian and
Muslim communities and pose a threat to national security. 149
However, the Supreme Court (as it then was) held that such
detention was unlawful, as it was contrary to the religious right
conferred by article 11 (1). so The Minister, according to the Court,
could not exercise the ISA to restrict the right of the respondent to
profess and practice his religion."' Furthermore, the Court ruled
that mere participation in meetings and seminars on Christianity
and conversion of Malays could not be regarded as a national
security threat.152
The second issue arising from the Article 11(4) restriction is
that state laws may prohibit the propagation of other doctrines
within Islam itself. On this limitation, Mohamed Salleh argues
that:
[T]his limitation is logical as it is necessary consequence
that follows naturally from the fact that Islam is the
Islam and the Constitution in Malaysia, 6 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 154, 167 (2002).
147 See id. at 168.
148 Ahmad Ibrahim, Minister of Home Affairs & Another v. Jamaluddin bin Othman,
1 M. L. J. 418 (1989).
149 Id
150 Id. at 419.
151 Id
152 Id at 420.
[Vol. XXXVI670
FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN MALAYSIA
religion of the Federation. Muslims in this country belong
to the Sunni Sect which recognizes only the teachings of
four specified schools of thought and regards others school
of thought as being contrary to true Islamic religion. It is
with a view to confining the practice of Islamic religion in
this country within the Sunni Sect that State Legislative
Assemblies and Parliament as respects the Federal
Territory are empowered to pass laws to protect
Muslims. . .
Thus, state laws may prohibit 'deviations' from the Sunni
sect. 5 4 Since Muslims in Malaysia adhere to Sunni teachings,
non-Sunni schools of thought are absolutely forbidden. "'
Although there is no constitutional provision entrenching the
position of Sunni teachings among Muslims in Malaysia, the
States' legislation provides that Muslims must conform with Sunni
teachings, with emphasis given to the Shafi'I school of thought.15 6
The executive and state religious departments have been fairly
active in crackdowns against adherents of other sects. For
example, between October 2000 and January 2001, the Federal
government detained six Shia followers under the ISA. 15
Surprisingly, none of them were charged either in civil or Syariah
courts, although the respective Fatwa Committees in the country,
including the one at the Federal level, issued a fatwa labeling the
group as "deviant.""' More recently, authorities detained more
153 MOHAMED SALLEH BIN ABAS, SELECTED ARTICLES & SPEECHES ON
CONSTITUTION, LAW & JUDICIARY 45 (Malaysian Law Publishers, 1984).
154 See id.
155 Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, Restrictions in Freedom of Religion in
Malaysia: A Conceptual Analysis with Special Reference to the Law of Apostasy, 4
MUSLIM WORLD J. HuM. RTs. 2, 10-11 (2007).
156 Unlike Perlis, it is stated that Muslims in this state must adhere to the Sunni's
teaching, with no specific school preferable. See OTHMAN ISHAK, FATWA DALAM
PERUNDANGAN ISLAM, 87-89 (1981); see also Ahmad Hidayat Buang, Analisis Fatwa-
fatwa Syariah di Malaysia (2004) in FATWA DI MALAYSIA 166 (Ahmad Hidayat Buang
ed., 2004).
157 Abdullah Saeed & Hassan Saeed, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, APOSTASY AND ISLAM
128 (2004).
158 See id; see also Jamila Hussain, Freedom of Religion in Malaysia: The Muslim
Perspective , in PUBLIC LAW IN CONTEMPORARY MALAYSIA 125 (Wu Min Aun, ed.,
1999) ("In March 1998, the New Straits Times reported that the Selangor Fatwa
Committee had ruled Shiite teachings to be deviant with the result that those
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than 200 Muslim Shiites in Selangor on grounds that the Shia
doctrine is a threat to national security. 159 The government
claimed that Shia doctrine allows for the killing of Muslims
considered to be infidels-i.e., non-Shiite Muslims.o60 However, it
has not been revealed whether these threats are true, and if true,
whether these threats are serious and imminent at all.
Another Islamic group that faced the same action is the Arqam
movement.16 1 Ashaari Muhammad formed a dakwah group in
1968 and called for the rejection of a secular way of life in favor
of an Islamic way of life. 162 Its members, through Aurad
Muhammadiah teachings, believe in self-sufficiency and
adherence to Islamic teachings. 163 By 1994, it was estimated
Arqam ran forty-eight small residential communities throughout
Peninsular Malaysia.'" The settlements were complete with their
own schools and clinics. The total number of its members was
estimated at about 100,000 with middle class Malay professionals
forming the majority.6 s Most of its male members normally
dressed in turbans and long green robes while female members
covered their faces entirely. In 1994, the National Fatwa Council
declared Arqam as deviant and unlawful, and its members were
told to disband.'6 6 Later, the government, through the Minister of
Home Affairs, declared Arqam unlawful under the Societies Act of
1966.1" In the latest development, it has been reported that the
disseminating such teachings could be charged with an offence under state Islamic
legislation."); and Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, Hak Tukar Agama Dalam
Perlembagaan Malaysia: Konflik Antara Kebebasan Beragamadan Hukum Islam, 1
SHARI'A J. 11, 34-5 (2003).
159 Associated Press, Malaysia May Charge 200 for Deviating from Islam, JAKARTA
POST (Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/12/20/malaysia-may-
charge-200-deviating-islam.html.
160 Id
161 Adil, supra note 155, at 64.
162 Id. at 10.
163 Id. at 64.
164 Id
165 Id
166 Adil, supra note 155, at 11.
167 Id. at 64. Ashaari, who was living in Thailand at the time of the order, was
extradited and detained. Id. After a nationally televised confession to deviating from
Islam, he and six aides were released without charge but had their movements restricted.
See Saeed & Saeed, supra note 157, at 129-30. See also Jamila Hussain, supra note 158,
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group has re-activated the movement under a new business
company, Rufaqa.6 1
VI. Evaluation: Challenges to Freedom of Religion in
Malaysia
A. The Dualistic Jurisdiction: A Legal Lacuna?
A 1988 constitutional amendment mandated the separation of
the civil and Islamic justice systems in Malaysia through Article
121(1A).16 9 It simply states that the civil courts were to have no
jurisdiction in matters within the Syariah court's jurisdiction." 0
Thus, Muslims are subjected to Syariah laws in certain matters,
and any conduct contrary to Islamic precepts is liable to
prosecution. Little did the promulgators of this amendment know
that such simple provision would later give rise to serious
jurisdictional conflicts, as well as tensions within the plural
at 126 (suggesting that government action against Arqam also may have been politically
motivated because the group had had past links to the PAS and had gained the support of
Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim).
168 Adil, supra note 155, at 64.
169 CONST. OF MALAYSIA, supra note 5, art. 121(1A).
170 Id This provision must be read together with the Ninth Schedule, List II, Item 1
which reads:
Except with respect to the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur, Labuan and
Putrajaya, Islamic law and personal and family law of persons professing the
religion of Islam, including the Islamic law relating to succession, testate and
intestate, betrothal, marriage, divorce, dower, maintenance, adoption,
legitimacy, guardianship, gifts, partitions and non-charitable trusts; Wakafs and
the definition and regulation of charitable and religious trusts, the appointment
of trustees and the incorporation of persons in respect of Islamic religious and
charitable endowments, institutions, trusts, charities and charitable institutions
operating wholly within the State; Malay customs; Zakat, Fitrah and Baitulmal
or similar Islamic religious revenue; mosques or any Islamic public places of
worship, creation and punishment of offences by persons professing the religion
of Islam against precepts of that religion, except in regard to matters included in
the Federal List; the constitution, organization and procedure of Syariah courts,
which shall have jurisdiction only over persons professing the religion of Islam
and in respect only of any of the matters included in this paragraph, but shall not
have jurisdiction in respect of offences except in so far as conferred by federal
law; the control of propagating doctrines and beliefs among persons professing
the religion of Islam; the determination of matters of Islamic law and doctrine
and Malay custom.
Id
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Malaysian community.
While the amendment is justified, Syariah is a distinct field
that requires expert handling by those trained in Islamic
jurisprudence.' 7 1 One problem with the separation of jurisdiction is
that it did not create an authoritative machinery to resolve an
overlapping of jurisdiction. The Lina Joy case, like other cases
implicating Islam and the freedom of religion, exposed a legal
lacuna on jurisdictional propriety. Joy's case, for instance,
involved the tension between one's constitutional right to religious
freedom and separate proceedings under the Syariah court to
renounce Islam.172 Which court has the authority to definitively
rule on the matter? In Lina Joy, dissenting Judge Richard
Malanjum demonstrated greater fidelity to constitutional
supremacy by arguing that "civil superior courts should not
decline jurisdiction by merely citing article 121(1A)."'7  He also
added that Article 121 (lA) "[o]nly protects the Syariah Court in
matters within their jurisdiction, which does not include the
interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution."074
The other important question is whether the Syariah courts
have jurisdiction over matters of apostasy, even in the absence of
legislation granting them the power to do so. It bears reiteration
that religion is a state matter and List II of Schedule 9 provides
matters-such as the administration of Islamic law-in which
states may legislate. In Lina Joy, no Federal Territories law
referenced how to deal with apostates."' A Syariah High Court in
the Federal Territories should only have criminal jurisdiction to
try any offence committed by a Muslim and punishable under
the Enactment or the Islamic Family Law (Federal Territories)
Act 1984 or under any other written law prescribing offences
against precepts of Islam. 176 The Syariah Criminal Offences
171 Faruqui, supra note 75.
172 Loo Lai Mee, Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Another,
4 M.L.J. 585, 593 (2007).
173 Id. at 631.
174 Id
175 The Federal Territories are not states per se, so laws on administration of Islam
are enacted by Parliament. Id.
176 Admin. of Islamic L. (Fed. Territories) § 46(2)(a) (Malay.).
674 [Vol. XXXVI
FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN MALAYSIA
(Federal Territories) Act 1997 is silent on apostasy. 177
Furthermore, the fact that Joy was no longer a Muslim raises the
question of whether she could properly be adjudicated under a
Syariah court.
There are two competing views on the jurisdiction of Syariah
courts. The first is that not all Syariah laws apply per se.7 8 On
this point, Sarwar criticizes the "[e]rroneous assumption that
'unwritten' (or un-enacted) Syariah law. . . can be applied in the
Syariah courts."l 7 9 Put differently, whether a matter falls under
the jurisdiction of Syariah courts is essentially up to the laws
enacted by State Assemblies (or Parliament in the case of the
Federal Territories). 18' This proposition-that state laws must
expressly confer jurisdiction to the Syariah courts-has found
favor in earlier decisions.'"' Therefore, because no laws govern
177 See Syariah Crime, Offences (Federal Territories) Act, Part 111 (Offenses
Relating to the Sanctity of the Religion of Islam and Its Institution).
178 See Malik Imtiaz Sarwar, Jurisdiction and Law: Syariah Courts, DISQUIET (Jan.
12, 2007, 9:40 a.m.), http://malikimtiaz.blogspot.com/2007/01/jurisdiction-and-law-
syariah-courts.html.
179 Id. ("[I]t is the erroneous assumption that 'unwritten' (or un-enacted) syariah law
or the established principles of hukum syara' can be applied in the syariah courts that has
led to the insistence that some matters must, or can only, be dealt with by the syariah
courts, notwithstanding the absence of any written law to that effect.").
180 Malik Imtiaz Sarwar, Latifah Mat Zin: Reaffirming the Supremacy of the
Constitution (II), DISQUIET (Aug. 16, 2007),
http://malikimtiaz.blogspot.com/2007/08/latifah-mat-zin-reaffirming-supremacy.html
("[lt does not matter that a particular principle of Islamic law exists by virtue of the Al-
Quran, the Hadith or the scholarly works of jurists, until such principle is codified into
law by the legislature in a constitutional manner the principle is not applicable as law.").
181 See Ng Wan Chan v. Majlis Ugama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Anor. (No 2)
3 M. L. J. 487, 489 (1991) ("[S]yariah court derives its jurisdiction under a state law,
(for Federal Territories - Act of Parliament) over any matter specified in the State List
under the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution. If State law does not confer on the
Syariah court any jurisdiction to deal with any matter in the State List, the Syariah court
is precluded from dealing with the matter. Jurisdiction cannot be derived by
implication."); Dalip Kaur v. Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai Polis Daerah, Bukit
Mertajam & Anor., 1 M. L. J. 1, 7 (1992) ("Clause 1A of art. 121 [sic] of the
Constitution effective from 10 June 1988 has taken away the jurisdiction of the civil
courts in respect of matters within the jurisdiction of the syariah courts. But that clause
does not take away the jurisdiction of the civil court to interpret any written laws of the
states enacted for the administration of Muslim law. . . . [I]f there are clear provisions in
the state Enactment the task of the civil court is made easier when it is asked to make a
declaration relating to the status of a person whether such person is or is not a Muslim
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apostasy in the Federal Territories, the decision in Lina Joy to
defer to the Syariah court creates a significant loophole in the
system.'82 The other view, one that is adopted by the majority in
Lina Joy, is that Syariah courts possess jurisdiction by implication,
i.e., that the power is inherent in State List of Schedule 9.8 In
other words, just because State laws do not confer jurisdiction to
the Syariah courts to adjudicate apostasy issues, this "does not
mean that such issues are to be adjudicated automatically by a
civil court."' 84 Indeed, in a string of cases before Lina Joy, this
appears to be the position of the courts.'s To the contrary, Judge
Malanjum argues that where fundamental rights are implicated,
"[t]here must be as far as possible [the] express authorization for
curtailment or violation of fundamental freedoms. No court or
authority should be easily allowed to have implied powers to
curtail rights constitutionally granted."' 86
The first view seems more persuasive, especially in a
constitutional democracy like Malaysia. It is quite absurd that
while the Constitution is the supreme law of the nation, it can be
thwarted by un-enacted State laws that are merely implied from
under the Enactment.").
182 See Syariah Crim., Offences (Federal Territories) Act, Part III (Offenses
Relating to the Sanctity of the Religion of Islam and Its Institution).
183 Loo Lai Mee, Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Another,
4 M.L.J. 585, 593 (2007).
184 Ahmad Faiz Abdul Rahman, Malaysia Laws on Apostasy Inadequate, IRELAND
ONLINE (Sept. 4, 1998), http://www.iol.ie/~afifi/BICNews/Afaiz/afaizl8.htm.
185 See Md Hakim Lee v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur,
1 M. L. J. 681, 688-89 (1998) ("[B]y virtue of para 1 in List II of the Ninth Schedule to
the Federal Constitution, the jurisdiction lies with the syariah court on its wider
jurisdiction over a person professing the religion of Islam even if no express provisions
are provided in the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 ....
[I]ts absence from the express provision in the Act would not confer the jurisdiction in
the civil court. The fact that the plaintiff may not have his remedy in the syariah court
would not make the jurisdiction exercisable by the civil court."); Soon Singh all Bikar
Singh v. Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM), 1 M.L.J. 489, 501-2 (1999)
(adopting the jurisdiction by implication approach and held that even where state
legislations do not confer jurisdiction to the Syariah courts, this can be implied from the
language of the legislation. "[I]t does seem inevitable that since matters on conversion to
Islam come under the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts, by implication conversion out of
Islam should also fall under the jurisdiction of the same courts.").
186 Loo Lai Mee, Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Another,
4 M.L.J. 585, 636 (2007).
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the state legislative list. On this point, Judge Malanjum argued-
perhaps rightly so-that the State legislative lists of power are
subordinate to fundamental rights of the Constitution. 1' The
continuous side-stepping by the civil courts in an area as important
as the constitutional right to religious freedom renders the issue
uncertain. It is also frustrating for citizens who resort to the
highest court in the land to uphold their rights, only to see their
appeals being turned down on technicalities.
B. Compliance with International Standards: The 'Asian
Values'Debate
The UDHR's freedom of thought, conscience and religion
provision includes one's right to change his or her religion.18 If
we further explore the meaning of religious freedom in the
international human rights regime, we may also find that "any
coercion that would impair the right to have or to adopt a religion
or belief' is prohibited, "including the use of threat of physical
force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to
adhere to their religious beliefs."' 89 This is the position of the
Human Rights Committee (HRC) in its general comments to
article 18(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR").' 90 While those comments are not specifically
directed at the UDHR, we can extrapolate those formulations to
understand what is envisaged by the universal human rights
regime in construing the meaning of religious freedom."' After
all, the ICCPR is a manifestation of the UDHR in its binding form
(although the former is stated in considerably greater detail), and
both documents are considered part of the international human
rights corpus.
On its face, the Malaysian constitutional provision on religious
187 Id. at 624-5 (Malanjum, J., dissenting).
188 UDHR, supra note 15, art. 18.
189 CCPR General Comment No. 22: Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience
or Religion), U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), adopted on its 48th Sess., July 30,
1993, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, para. 5,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/453883fb22.html [hereinafter HRC].
190 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 19, 1966) [hereinafter
ICCPR].
191 See UDHR, supra note 15, art. 18.
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freedom compares favorably to international standards. 192
Nonetheless, the Federal Constitution's careful omission of the
freedom of a person to renounce or change his religion or belief
without punishment (although some argue that this freedom can be
implied) may raise questions as to the true extent of this
constitutional provision. In practice, conversion does not seem to
be an option-at least to Muslims-due to certain state laws
imposing punishment for apostasy.'93 While capital punishment is
never imposed on apostates in Malaysia, those who convert may
be required, by state law, to attend counseling sessions.19 4 Such
forced rehabilitation is arguably contrary to the Constitution's
guarantee of personal liberty. Even where there is no state law on
point, such as in Lina Joy, it seems that the exercise of that right is
virtually impossible because of uncertainties within the legal
system.
Another potential friction with the international regime lies in
the prohibition against propagation of any religious doctrines
among Muslims. 19' It is, without doubt, a challenge to the
conventional idea of religious freedom, at least in the view of
international human rights doctrine.' 96 Although the restriction is
defended on the basis of protecting social stability,197 it implies
some form of discrimination in the practice of religion and places
other religions at a disadvantage vis-A-vis Islam. Moreover,
restrictions on propagation of other Islamic doctrines may be seen
as an over-regulation by state authorities seeking to impose their
particular understanding of Islam on others. The controls may
curtail religionists for whom proselytising is an integral part of
worship.19 8 In turn, this may affect the freedom to teach and
practice one's religious beliefs. On the flip side, the concern with
192 Tad Stahnke and Robert C. Blitt, The Religion-State Relationship and the Right
to Freedom ofReligion or Belief A Comparative Textual Analysis ofthe Constitutions of
Predominantly Muslim Countries, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 947, 964-66 (2005).
193 See Masum, supra note 100, at vii-viii.
194 See Jamila Hussain, supra note 158, at 132.
195 See CoNST. OF MALAYSIA, supra note 5, art. 11(4).
196 Note that the Constitution does not prohibit propagation per se, but where states
enact laws against propagation, this would not be deemed unconstitutional. See
discussion supra Part II.B.
197 Masum, supra note 100, at iv.
198 See id.
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proselytism is that such practices may themselves exceed the
bounds of religious freedom, especially when they amount to some
form of coercion and undue influence on another to adopt another
religion. It is worth mentioning that proselytizing is not only an
issue in Malaysia; it has also been highlighted as something that
"[c]ould eventually lead to the collapse of social norms and
cultural identities [in Africa]."l 99
Nevertheless, the problem with the international checks and
balances mechanism in Malaysia is the absence of any legally
binding commitment to international human rights obligations.
The standing of JDHR continues to be a matter of great debate.
Although, as mentioned above, writers have argued that the
UDHR has matured into customary international law,2 00 it is also
not necessarily incorrect to insist on the declaratory nature of the
UDHR (which imposes no obligation on states). Malaysia's
reluctance to veer towards a concrete international human rights
obligation is hardly surprising. During the Mahathir
administration, there was an obsession with the 'Asian Values'
doctrine circling within the politico-legal atmosphere in Southeast
Asia.2 0' This doctrine, perhaps the hallmark of the Universalist-
Relativist tension in the human rights discourse, essentially
challenges the universal human rights scheme based on Asia's
unique cultural traditions. 20 The underlying idea is that
preserving social harmony and collective welfare is more
important than upholding a "western," individualistic notion of
human rights. Freeman argues that this distinction lies in the
challenge to the value of rights.203
However, among the political elites, there is a lack of
consensus not only on what the doctrine means, but also whether it
199 Steiner, et al., supra note 18, at 607 ( "Since the right to religious freedom
includes the right to be left alone - to choose freely whether to believe and what to
believe in - the rights regime by requiring that African religions compete in the
marketplace of ideas incorrectly assumes a level playing field. The rights corpus not only
forcibly imposes on African religions the obligation to compete . . . but also protects
evangelizing religions in their march toward universalization.").
200 See supra Part III.
201 Michael Freeman, Human Rights, Democracy, and 'Asian Values,'9 PAC. REV.
352, 354 (1996).
202 See id. at 353.
203 Id. at 355.
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is tenable at all. 2" For instance, Indonesia's Foreign Minister
rejected the idea of an existing clash between the supposedly
'western' universal human rights concept and distinctively 'Asian'
point of view. 205 On the other hand, Donnelly argues that if
leaders such as Singapore's Lee Kwan Yew and Malaysia's
Mahathir claim that if a substantial deviation from the common
international human rights standard is based on culture, it is
legitimately allowed.206 The Mahathir model of 'Asian Values'
include the elements of strong authority, priority of community
over the individual, and a strong family based society.207
These concepts are important because they shape the way the
government and, to some extent, the courts view the parameters of
religious freedom. Thus, the underlying idea seems to be that
restrictions on religious freedom may be justified in exchange for
maintaining social order not only among Malaysia's multi-
religious society, but also within the Muslim community itself. It
is worth emphasizing that the basic responsibility of a State is to
safeguard and prevent encroachments on the freedom of religion
for all citizens. The problem in Malaysia, however, is the
ostensibly over-regulation by the State of private matters. For
Muslims, it seems very odd that 'personal sins' such as apostasy
become matters between an individual and the state. Prominent
Islamic scholars such as Mohammad Hashim Kamali have spoken
out against this, arguing that it is not for the state to legislate
punishments for personal sins.208
C. Asian Values, and The Politics ofRace, Religion, and
Social Order
The assertion of a constitutional right to religious freedom is
bound to attract competing interests in the multiracial Malaysian
204 Id. at 353.
205 Id.
206 JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRACTICE 107 (2003).
207 Mohd Azizuddin Sani, Mahathir as a Cultural Relativist: Mahathirism on
Human Rights 4 (paper presented at the 17' Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies
Association of Australia in Melbourne, July 1-3, 2008),
http://arts.monash.edu.aulmai/asaa/mohdazizuddinmohdsani.pdf.
208 Shanon Shah, Syariah Law Galore, NUT GRAPH (Dec. 14, 2009),
http://www.thenutgraph.com/syariah-law-galore/.
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society. Thus, discussions on 'Asian Values' are incomplete
without considering the socio-political and racial dimensions to
the freedom of religion debate. For non-Muslims, freedom of
religion is often taken for granted until various problems are
brought to the public eye. These include cases implicating
spouses and children, such as the religion that the children should
be raised with. For the Malay-Muslim majority, the unease is
attributable to the purported ramifications on ethnicity and
politics.
Generally, the majority of Malays are deeply attached to their
religion and any attempt to weaken a Malay's faith may be
perceived as an indirect attempt to erode Malay political power
and identity.20 9 Renouncing Islam is viewed as deserting the
Malay community; Article 160(2) of the Constitution defines a
Malay as one who professes the religion of Islam.21 0 Furthermore,
cases of apostasy strike instant correlations with proselytism and
impressions of an indirect attack against the sanctity of Islam as
the religion of the Federation. Faruqi suggested that wide-spread
conversion of Malay-Muslims to other religions will have grave
implications for the delicate racial balance between the Malay and
non-Malay communities and may well jeopardize the stability of
the nation.211
In Lina Joy, it is evident that social order considerations
played a role in the majority opinion.212 The majority alluded to
several Muslim NGOs' assertion that conversion at will could
cause chaos among Muslims and the religion of Islam.2 13 It is
accepted that the Constitution provides that the freedom of
religion does not authorize any acts contrary to any general law
relating to public order, public health or morality.214 However, the
Lina Joy decision gave no clear guidance on when a 'public order'
209 Faruqi, supra note 103.
210 Id.
211 Shad Saleem Faruqi, Constitutional Limits on Religious Liberty, THE SUN (May
25, 2006), http://www.sun2surf.com/article.cfn?id=14215.
212 Loo Lai Mee, Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Another,
4 M.L.J. 585, 594 (2007).
213 Id. at 612.
214 Id. at 616.
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justification would be tenable. 215 The majority did not explore this
in great depth and it almost seems as if the 'public order'
justification is a mere assumption.2 16 From an international human
rights norm perspective, there is no doubt that the freedom of
religion is not absolute. However, where derogations are
permitted on the basis of public order, this affects only
manifestations of belief and not the freedom to adopt or profess a
belief.217
To some, the rise of political Islam has some bearing on the
way the Malay-Muslim majority views religion and their
expectations on the status of Islam in the country. 218 Although
Islam's role was initially thought to be merely ceremonial, the
resurgence of Islam in the 1970s and 1980s arguably changed
this.219 The Islamic Party, PAS, who vowed to establish an Islamic
state where only Muslims would hold political power, and
subsequently took over the state of Kelantan.220 In response to this
change in the political climate, the ruling Barisan Nasional
("BN") multiethnic coalition launched various Islamization
initiatives in the legal, institutional, and educational sectors.221
While government policies leaned towards Islamic values,
subsequent PAS electoral successes have put the federal
government under considerable pressure.22 2 These events shaped
the emergence of the "Islamic State" rhetoric. Harding observes:
The electoral successes of PAS created a new environment
for the discussion of the role of Islamic law. Beginning
around 1999, for example, there was public debate about
the concept of an Islamic state, which intensified and
broadened following an announcement by the Prime
Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad in Parliament that
Malaysia was an 'Islamic state'. Dr Mahathir even went so
far as to say that Malaysia was a 'fundamentalist, not a
215 See id at 594.
216 See id.at 594.
217 See supra Part III.A.
218 Harding supra note 3, at 502-03.
219 Id
220 Id. at 502.
221 Id at 503.
222 See id. at 504-06.
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moderate Islamic state', and that it was also a 'model
Islamic state.' 22 3
In conclusion, the language of 'social order,' often cited to
curtail rights, is not a uniquely Malaysian concept. However, the
more important question is where one draws the line between
maintaining social stability and securing individual rights of
religious practice and freedom of religion? This needs to be re-
evaluated in Malaysia, where the politicization of the "Islamic
State" identity and fear-mongering has had a considerable effect
on defining the parameters of fundamental rights afforded to the
citizens by the Constitution. The restrictions on rights of others
due to mere political insecurity cannot be tolerated if we are to
uphold human rights and respect for religious convictions.
D. Moving Away from the Universalist-Relativist Debate
The Malaysian experience with freedom of religion is
demonstrative of the very tension between the universal
conception of human rights and the relativity of cultural and
religious norms. The former resists religious traditions that are
arguably at odds with the modem liberal interpretation of
universal human rights principles.224 The latter is most often
advanced on the basis of 'social order' and the desire to maintain
distinct 'Asian Values.' But the expos6 on the Malaysian
practices suggests that there are serious questions yet to be
resolved. Thus, any firm reconciliation with international human
rights standards is problematic, and local institutional and political
obstacles to the exercise of religious freedom complicate this.
As a starting point, it is noteworthy that the two polar
assumptions of human rights "[w]ould have been foreign to the
framers of the [UDHR]." 225 Moreover, the final Vienna
Convention Document which all UN members have accepted
stresses that it is the participating States' duty to implement human
rights while bearing in mind that countries have different religious
and cultural traditions. 226 But the challenge to resolve the
Universalist-Relativist gap in the context of religious freedom lies
223 Id. at 506.
224 Mohamad, supra note 108, at 155.
225 Mary Ann Glendon, supra note 19, at 139, 142.
226 Id
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not only in the tension between religious and secular spheres, but
also in the relationship of religion to other conception of rights2 7
but also to one religion vis-A-vis another.22 8
The problem plaguing the international human rights
movement is the failure to appreciate the human rights canon as a
whole. Hence, there lies an obstacle in properly conceiving the
human rights morality when construing the freedom of religion.
In resolving this, one should look at the UDHR in its call for
everyone to "act in the spirit of brotherhood" as a starting point for
refuting claims of individualism and that the human rights regime
is discriminatory against non-Western cultures. 2 9 The freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion, must also be considered in light
of Article 29, which emphasizes that "[e]veryone has duties to the
community."230 Quite interestingly, the UDHR is silent on the
meaning, origin and enumeration of such duties,23 1 so much so that
this is open to interpretation and incorporation according to
varying cultural and religious norms.
"[R]eligious beliefs and human rights are complementary
expressions of similar ideas, although the former invokes the
language of duties rather than rights."232 Therefore, human duties
should not be ignored when one speaks of human rights. But this
is not a solution in and of itself. Some religious duties may
impinge on rights, and more often than not religious authorities
will assert primacy of those traditions over rights. 233 This is more
challenging when that assertion is grounded upon highly
227 Danchin, supra note 50, at 102.
228 See An-Naim, supra note 49, at 95 (arguing that to restrict the debate of freedom
of religion within these two polar extremes is not only misleading, but also
counterproductive).
229 UDHR, supra note 15, art. 1.
230 Id. art. 29.
231 Nurhalida Mohamed Khalil, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the Renunciation of Faith: in Defense of What is Right and Not What is Good? Paper
presented at the Conference on Religion, Law and Governance in Southeast Asia, at 8
(Jan. 29 - 31 2010). See also Henry J. Steiner et al., supra note 18, at 347-48 (stating that
the ambit of human duties is wide; encompassing all dimensions of man's life, be they
physical, spiritual and mental; and that human duties are not merely a method of
prescription of a subject's relationship with the state alone: they are deeply embedded in
social and familial relationships and also in man's relationship with God and Nature).
232 Steiner et al., supra note 18, at 569.
233 Id
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conservative, counter-progressive conceptions of religion.
Furthermore, religions are chiefly concerned with the rights of
their constituents, including exercising the right to freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion.2 34 So the question becomes: do
rights come first, or duties? It is problematic for human rights to
be strictly defined by duties, or vice versa. Religious duties, in the
Islamic context, for example, offer different opinions on the extent
of religious freedom, especially in cases of conversions and
apostasy. More problematic is the differing implementation of
religious laws in various States and respective claims of
superiority by different religions. The human rights canon, as a
general secular construct, did not provide for these intricate
contingencies.
Perhaps the ultimate resolution lies in focusing on the human
rights morality, which is grounded upon the notion of human
dignity-that all human beings are born free and equal. This not
only means that one's fundamental rights must be respected in
spirit and essence, but it also denotes respect for the exercise of
rights by others. It is indeed moral to respect individual rights, the
exercise of which is essential not only for one to develop as a
person, but to contribute to community development because
individuals are in fact part and parcel of a community. Thus,
human duties must be carried out concurrently with assertions of
human rights as far as those duties are compatible with human
dignity and the human rights ideal of respecting individual beliefs,
that is, "[w]here the government does not prescribe orthodoxy or
prohibit particular religions or beliefs."23 5 In the religious freedom
context, it is consistent with human rights morality to respect
one's independent choice of belief. Human duties to community
should be allowed to run their course by providing room for
discussion and resolution. But if such process is ultimately futile,
then the dignity of individual choice should be respected without
unnecessary state-imposed hurdles.
234 Henkin, supra note 46, at 234. Henkin gives an example of the right to
proselytize as freedom of expression, and that some religions may "[c]laim such a right
as part of the right of their members to manifest their religion in teaching and practice.
But some religions, we know, will resist the right of their members to change their
religion." Id.
235 Shelton & Kiss, supra note 83, at 575.
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VII. Conclusion
Religion is an important feature of Malaysia by reason of
tradition and history, and it will continue to be important in the
social, political and legal discourse. The relationship between law
and religion is a complex, albeit evolving issue. But with the
increasing human rights consciousness and growing number of
progressives among both the Malay-Muslim majority and other
minorities, a shift in mentality is taking place.
The foregoing sections demonstrate that not only is the
Malaysian practice complicated from a constitutional perspective,
it also raises serious questions in light of the human rights regime
on religious freedom. If, as previously suggested, the Lina Joy
outcome will "[d]efine the nation's character,"'23 6 then the plural
Malaysian society has a lot to cringe about. The resolution of
religious conversion cases and restrictions on religious doctrines
do not seem to be conducive to maintaining religious harmony and
pluralism in a divided society. The constitutional promise of
religious freedom and equality, rosy as it may seem, is being
eroded. The various political and social considerations, and
unyielding insistence on 'Asian Values,' increase the complexity
of this issue. While we remain cognizant of local conditions and
allow society to evolve in shaping human rights consciousness
through education and advocacy, courts also bear an important
responsibility in defining the parameters of citizens' constitutional
rights.
The arguments above also have one thing in common-putting
interests of morality, humanity, and social stability at the heart.
Although human rights are secular and Western in origin, the
UDHR is a document of persuasive moral authority. The morality
stemming from respect for individual rights is important as the
exercise of those rights will bear significant impact on community
living and social order. It is also notable that duties to the
community would be to some extent arbitrary or rather, a matter
for domestic law and politics.237 We should be mindful of this
because governments have an interest in imposing rules that
236 Prystay, supra note 12.
237 Khalil, supra note 231, at 12 (citing T. Opsahl, Articles 29 and 30: the Other
Side of the Coin, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY
457, 457-58 (A.Eide et al. eds., 1992)).
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arguably violate individual rights to buttress their position and
maintain the status quo. For that reason, there must be solid
recognition of the role of human rights as a mechanism of checks
and balances against the state. It must be emphasized that the
basic responsibility of a state is to safeguard the freedom of
religion; that is, to prevent encroachments on this fundamental
right. The problem in Malaysia, however, is the seemingly over-
regulation by the state of private matters. It seems very odd that
'personal sins' such as apostasy, alcohol consumption, and non-
performance of Friday prayers for men become matters between
an individual and the state. Prominent Islamic scholars such as
Mohammad Hashim Kamali have spoken out against this, arguing
that it is not for the state to legislate punishments for personal
sins.238
A strong grounding on values, through both human rights and
duties to the community, is the key to tolerance and social
stability. We must leave the chauvinism on relativity of norms
and focus instead on the common morality that can be derived
from both Universalist and Relativist conceptions of human rights.
Instead of getting bogged down in ideological antagonisms and
arrogant dismissals, freedom of religion has to be understood in
the proper context in order to promote progressive reconciliation
with religious precepts. For one to believe that the other has the
right to practice their faith freely, the conviction must begin from
the firm morality of respecting human dignity and beliefs.
Religious issues in a plural society such as Malaysia must be open
to debates by all sections of the community. Sensitivities can only
be resolved through civilized deliberation and dialogue between
races in which decision must be reached in consensus and
compromise. While concerns of social stability are
understandable, actions must be reasonable and not at the expense
of human dignity. If there are genuine concerns about a pandemic
of conversions and apostasy in a particular religion, then the root
cause of the problem should be examined, and not by the
simplistic solution of curtailing rights of others for political
convenience.2 39
238 Shah, supra note 208.
239 Abidin, supra note 122. Religious cleric Dr. Asri invites Muslims to study
reasons of the apostasy phenomenon, rather than getting panicky over stories of
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apostates. Id. He argues that from the evidence gathered from hadiths and the deeds of
the Prophet's companions, the jurisprudential scholars state that it is necessary for the
apostate to be given room for discussion, to clarify any confusion regarding the religion,
and to call for repentance. Id.
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